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THE PINES V CITY OF SANTA MONICA. REDEFINING
THE FOCUS OF CALIFORNIA'S SUBDIVISION
MAP ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
The unprecedented population growth California has experienced
in recent decades has led to a parallel growth in the need for housing,
and, consequently, to a proliferation of residential subdivisions. The
spread of new subdivisions across the California landscape has created
serious financing problems for local governments responsible for pro-
viding community infrastructure-schools, roads, parks, flood control,
and sewage disposal facilities-to serve the new neighborhoods.'
The passage in 1978 of Proposition 13,2 California's celebrated
property tax limitation initiative, has further aggravated the problems
of local governments by severely restricting their capacity to generate
revenues through real property taxes. These restrictions have forced
local governments to take a fresh look at both the costs imposed and
the revenues generated by new development.4
In an effort to offset the revenue shortfall, many localities have
attempted to circumvent Proposition 13 by imposing fees, charges and
1. See generally Taylor, Current Problems in California Subdivision Control, 13 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 344 (1962); Hanna, Subdivisions.- Conditions Imposed by Local Governments, 6
SANTA CLARA LAW. 1972 (1966); Frieden, The New Regulation Comes to Suburbia, THE
PUB. INTEREST, Spring, 1979, at 15 [hereinafter cited as Frieden].
2. Proposition 13 added Article XIIIA to the California Constitution. Section l(a) of
Article XIIIA provides: "The maximum amount of any ad valorem tax on real property
shall not exceed one percent (1%) of the full cash value of such property. The one percent
(1%) tax [is] to be collected by the counties and apportioned according to law to the districts
within the counties."
3. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF
PROPOSITION 13 ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, at 3 (1979). For additional background on the
effects of Proposition 13 on local government financing, see JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT
COMMITTEE, OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL, CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF Lo-
CAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE SINCE PROPOSITION 13 (1980); REPORT OF OFFICE OF PLAN-
NING AND RESEARCH, EDMUND G. BROWN JR., GOVERNOR, THE GROWTH REVOLT:
AFTERSHOCK OF PROPOSITION 13? (1980); LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF PROPOSITION 13 ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (1979);
Naumann, Local Government Taxing Authority Under Proposition 13, 10 Sw. U.L. REV. 795
(1978).
4. One result of this sharpened focus has been the use of cost/impact models that assist
local officials and developers objectively to assess the costs of new development, and to
fashion means to meet those costs. FINAL REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY SELECT COMMITTEE
ON LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION OF TAX AND SPENDING INITIATIVES 17-18 [hereinafter cited as
FINAL REPORT].
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assessments on new residential development.' Although such exactions
are by no means a new phenomenon,6 Proposition 13 has increased
their popularity. Generally, these exactions force developers to provide
or finance both on and off-site capital improvements by conditioning
permission to subdivide or build upon payment of the exaction.
Increased reliance on subdivision exactions to replace lost prop-
erty tax revenues raises troubling questions for the state as a whole.
The charges imposed are typically passed on to purchasers of homes in
the new development. Accordingly, some argue that newcomers to the
community are forced to bear a disproportionate share of the cost of
community infrastructure, whereas long-time residents of older sections
of the community benefit by infrastructure which was financed by pre-
Proposition 13 property taxes.9
Others suggest that increased local power to condition subdivision
approval on payment of exactions may reduce the supply of affordable
housing throughout the state. 10 Research indicates that low-density,
high-value housing tracts produce more desirable fiscal results for a
locality than do higher-density, more moderately priced tracts." Cities
and counties, understandably preoccupied with compelling local
financing problems, and relatively unconcerned about a statewide
housing shortage, may be expected to use their exaction power to favor
low-density housing.2
The mechanism for accommodating the competing interests of
5. Id. See also Note, Subdivision Land Dedication: Objectives and Objections, 27
STAN. L. REv. 419 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Subdivision Land Dedication].
6. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Rancho Homes, Inc., 40 Cal. 2d 764, 256 P.2d 305
(1953); Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Newark, 18 Cal. App. 3d 107, 95 Cal. Rptr.
648 (1971).
7. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 18. Examples include exactions to defray costs of
sewer construction, drainage facilities, park and recreational facilities and school construc-
tion. See generally Hanna, supra note I.
8. 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 19.24 (1968). See Note, Subdivision
Land Dedication, supra note 5, at 428 n.24, 443; Harvith, Subdivision Dedication Require-
ments-Some Observations and an Alternative: A Special Tax on Gain from Realty, 33 AL-
BANY L. REv. 474, 475-76 (1969).
The constitutionality of requiring new residents to bear the cost of facilities made nec-
essary by their entry into the community is no longer open to question. For a discussion of
the relevant decisions, see Municipalities: Validity of Subdivision Fees/or Schools and Parks,
66 COLUM. L. REV. 974, 975 (1966). A different question is raised, however, when newcom-
ers are required to assume costs of infrastructure previously borne by the community at
large. This is the concern voiced in FINAL REPORT, supra note 4.
9. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 18.
10. Id at 18-19.
I1. Id at 19.
12. Id See also Frieden, supra note I, at 18.
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statewide needs and local control over development is California's Sub-
division Map Act. 3 The Map Act is in part a form of enabling legisla-
tion authorizing local governments to require developers to fulfill
certain requirements for the design and improvement of their develop-
ments as a condition of subdivision map approval.' 4 Until recently,
California courts resisted local government efforts to use subdivision
exactions as a means of raising revenues for general city purposes by
focusing on the Map Act's requirement that exactions be reasonably
related to needs created by the subdivision." In the absence of such a
relationship, local exactions have been struck down as preempted by
the Map Act. 6 A recent California Supreme Court decision, however,
has reversed that pattern by rejecting the reasonable relationship stan-
dard, focusing Map Act analysis instead on the nature of the exaction,
i.e., whether the payment is designated a fee or a tax. In The Pines v.
City of Santa Monica, 7 the court upheld Santa Monica's Condomin-
ium Tax Law. 8 In the form upheld by the court,'9 the Condominium
Tax Law required developers of new or newly converted condomini-
ums to pay a one-time charge of $1,000 per planned salable unit as a
condition precedent to subdivision map approval.20 The tax was desig-
nated a business license tax. Unlike conditions on subdivision ap-
proval previously upheld by the courts, however, the Condominium
Tax Law did not earmark revenues for any purpose related to the sub-
division in question, but required them to be deposited directly into the
city's general fund.2 ' By thus refocusing Map Act analysis, Pines in-
creased local power to generate general revenues at the expense of new
community residents.
13. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66410-66499.37 (West Supp. 1982) [hereinafter cited as the
Map Act].
14. See infra notes 62-79 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 64-78 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Santa Clara County Contractors Ass'n v. City of Santa Clara, 232 Cal.
App. 2d 564, 43 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1965); Newport Bldg. Corp. v. City of Santa Ana, 210 Cal.
App. 2d 771, 26 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1962); Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318
P.2d 561 (1957).
17. 29 Cal. 3d 656, 630 P.2d 521, 175 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1981).
18. SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE art. VI, ch. 6B, §§ 6651-6658 (1973).
19. The Condominium Tax Law was amended in 1978. See infra note 115 and accom-
panying text. The court in Pines, however, construed the 1973 version, which will be re-
ferred to throughout this note.
20. Subdivision maps must be prepared and filed with local authorities for subdivisions
creating, among other things, five or more condominiums. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66426 (West
Supp. 1982).
21. 29 Cal. 3d at 659, 630 P.2d at 521, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 336; see infra notes 60-61, 111-15
and accompanying text.
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This note analyzes the holding and rationale of Pines in light of
the Map Act's history in the California courts and concludes that the
decision reached by the supreme court was unwarranted. It also ad-
dresses the question of whether taxes like the Condominium Tax Law
should be considered "special taxes" within the meaning of Article
XIIIA, section four of the California Constitution.2
II. THE FACTS
The Pines was one of eight plaintiffs, each of which was a limited
partnership formed for the purpose of acquiring land in the city of
Santa Monica, developing condominium projects on the land, and sell-
ing the completed units. 23 In conformity with the requirements of the
Map Act,24 plaintiffs submitted tentative and final subdivision maps to
the city for approval.25 Subsequently, the city notified plaintiffs that it
would not approve the maps unless plaintiffs either paid the tax re-
quired by the Condominium Tax Law or signed an agreement, secured
by a lien on the property, that payment would be made.26
Plaintiffs paid the tax, which amounted to the total sum of
$138,000 plus interest,27 and then filed claims for refund.28 They as-
serted that the Condominium Tax Law contravened the Map Act by
conditioning subdivision approval on the payment of a tax;29 that sub-
division development and construction are matters of statewide con-
cern; and that legislation in an area of statewide concern (here, the
Map Act) preempts conflicting regulation by a charter city.30 Santa
Monica, on the other hand, contended that, as a charter city, it was
constitutionally empowered to impose the tax, regardless of the provi-
sions of the Map Act.31 The trial court ruled the tax invalid for the
reasons asserted by plaintiffs.32  The California Supreme Court
22. See infra note 230.
23. All of the eight plaintiffs were limited partnerships formed for the same purpose.
Opening Brief of Appellant at 15-16, The Pines v. City of Santa Monica, 108 Cal. App. 3d
577, 166 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1980), vacated, 29 Cal. 3d 656, 630 P.2d 521, 175 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1981).
24. See supra note 20.
25. Respondents' Brief at 2-3, The Pines v. City of Santa Monica, 108 Cal. App. 3d 577,
166 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1980), vacated, 29 Cal. 3d 656, 630 P.2d 521, 175 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1981).
26. 29 Cal. 3d at 659, 630 P.2d at 521, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
27. Id at 658, 630 P.2d at 521, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
28. Id
29. Id at 660, 630 P.2d at 522, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
30. Id
31. See infra note 103.
32. 29 Cal. 3d at 658, 630 P.2d at 521, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
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reversed.33
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
The supreme court did not address the issue framed by the parties:
whether the Map Act preempted the Condominium Tax Law.
34 In-
stead, the court concluded that the Map Act and the Condominium
Tax Law were not in conflict; hence, there was no need to reach Santa
Monica's argument that local taxation is a municipal affair in which
legislation by a charter city prevails over conflicting state law.35
To reach the conclusion that state and local law did not conflict,
the court was forced to disapprove a line of court of appeal decisions
that had construed the Map Act as a limitation on local taxing power.36
Under the reasoning of those decisions, because the authority granted
to local governments by the Map Act is confined to the regulation of
subdivision design and improvement, any local charge unrelated to de-
sign and improvement is an invalid interference with the statutory
scheme for subdivision regulation.37
The Pines court held that the earlier cases contravened the general
principle that local governments may tax activities regulated by the
state.38 Because local governments may tax businesses and professions
governed by state licensing schemes, the court reasoned, Santa Monica
should be able to tax the subdivision of land for development despite
the existence of a state scheme regulating subdivisions.3 9 The court dis-
tinguished cases in which local business license tax ordinances had
been invalidated,4" explaining that the ordinances involved in those
cases contained regulatory features which conflicted with the state reg-
ulatory scheme in question. The Condominium Tax Law, on the other
33. 29 Cal. 3d 656, 630 P.2d 521, 175 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1981).
34. For a general discussion of preemption analysis, see infra notes 103 & 119; 116-21
and accompanying text.
35. 29 Cal. 3d at 664 n.3, 630 P.2d at 525 n.3, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 340 n.3.
36. See Benny v. County of Alameda, 105 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 164 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1980);
Santa Clara County Contractors Ass'n v. City of Santa Clara, 232 Cal. App. 2d 564, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 86 (1965); Newport Bldg. Corp. v. City of Santa Ana, 210 Cal. App. 2d 771, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 797 (1962); Wine v. Council of Los Angeles, 177 Cal. App. 2d 157, 2 Cal. Rptr. 94
(1960); Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957).
37. 29 Cal. 3d at 660, 630 P.2d at 522, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 337. For further discussion of the
Map Act and its requirements, see infra notes 62-79 and accompanying text.
38. 29 Cal. 3d at 660, 630 P.2d at 522, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
39. Id at 660-61, 630 P.2d at 522-23, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
40. See, e.g., Agnew v. City of Culver City, 51 Cal. 2d 474, 334 P.2d 571 (1959); Agnew
v. City of Los Angeles, 51 Cal. 2d 1, 330 P.2d 385 (1958); Biber Electric Co. v. City of San
Carlos, 181 Cal. App. 2d 342, 5 Cal. Rptr. 261 (1960); Lynch v. City of Los Angeles, 114 Cal.
App. 2d 115, 249 P.2d 856 (1952).
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hand, was a purely revenue-raising measure with no regulatory
aspects.4'
The Pines court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the Map Act's
legislative history evinced a legislative intent that the Map Act preempt
local subdivision taxes.4 2 This argument was based on two separate
legislative developments. First, plaintiffs contended that when the leg-
islature recodified the Map Act in 1974 without substantial revision, it
adopted the existing judicial construction of the Map Act as a limita-
tion on local taxing power.43 In rejecting this view, the court deter-
mined that the legislature's intentions were not sufficiently clear to
warrant such a conclusion. 4 The court also summarily dismissed plain-
tiffs' argument that because the legislature had failed to pass two bills
which proposed to expand local authority to regulate subdivisions, the
legislature must have intended not to expand local authority.4 The
Pines court reasoned that because the proposals were only parts of bills
intended to recodify the entire Map Act, it would be unreasonable to
conclude that failure to pass the bills indicated legislative rejection of
the proposals. 6
Finally, the Pines court concluded that the Condominium Tax
Law was not made regulatory by the requirement of payment of the tax
as a condition precedent to approval of the subdivision, as plaintiffs
contended. Rather, the court viewed the condition as a valid means of
revenue enforcement.47
Thus, the Pines court held that the Condominium Tax Law "im-
poses a revenue tax that does not conflict with the state scheme for
regulating subdivisions." 4 Earlier cases construing the Map Act,49 to
the extent they disagreed with this conclusion, were disapproved.5 1
IV. BACKGROUND
A. The Map Act
In its present form, the Map Act is the product of ninety years of
41. 29 Cal. 3d at 661-62, 630 P.2d at 523, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
42. Id at 662-63, 630 P.2d at 523-24, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
43. Id at 662, 630 P.2d at 523-24, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
44. For further discussion, see infra note 194.
45. 29 Cal. 3d at 662-63, 630 P.2d at 524, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
46. Id; for further discussion of the Map Act's legislative history and its treatment by
the Pines court, see infra note 194.
47. Id. at 663, 630 P.2d at 524, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
48. Id. at 664, 630 P.2d at 525, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
49. See supra note 36.
50. 29 Cal. 3d at 664, 630 P.2d at 525, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
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evolution. Its earliest ancestor,51 enacted in 1893, was concerned pri-
marily with accurate land description and required only that the owner
of land developed into lots for sale file a map of the subdivision with
the County Recorder. 52 In subsequent years, as the legislature came to
recognize the important role that the subdivision of land plays in urban
development,5 3 the Map Act underwent periodic amendment. 4 By
1937, the Act had assumed its present general form,55 although the leg-
islature has continued to amend it from time to time.56
The Map Act is a comprehensive statutory scheme governing sub-
division approval.57 Its purposes are (1) to coordinate new subdivision
designs with existing development 58 and (2) to require subdividers to
provide necessary subdivision improvements which are then dedicated
to local government.5 9 To attain these ends, the Map Act requires that
tentative and final maps be approved by the responsible city or county
for all subdivisions creating five or more parcels, five or more condo-minims, a community apartment project containing five or more par-
cels, or for the conversion of a dwelling to a stock cooperative
containing five or more dwelling units.60 The cornerstone of the Map
Act is the requirement that no parcel be sold and no construction be
commenced until a final map has been recorded in full compliance
with the Map Act and any local ordinances enacted under its
51. 1893 Cal. Stat., ch. 80, sees. 1-4.
52. Id. at sec. 3.
53. See R. RATCLIFF, URBAN LAND ECONOMICS 415 (1949); Taylor, supra note 1.
54. 1907 Cal. Stat., ch. 231 (adding requirements for public approval, naming of subdi-
visions, drawing of maps); 1929 Cal. Stat., ch. 837, sees. 1-40.
55. 1937 Cal. Stat., ch. 670 (current version at CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66410-66499.37
(West Supp. 1982)).
56. In 1965 the legislature amended the Map Act, then a division of CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE, to add § 11546 (now CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66477 (West Supp. 1982)), which author-
ized municipalities to require dedication of land for park purposes, or payment in lieu
thereof, as a condition of map approval. 1965 Cal. Stat., ch. 1809, sec. 2, at 4183. In 1974
the entire Map Act was repealed and reenacted in the Government Code. 1974 Cal. Stat.,
ch. 1536, sec. 4, at 3464.
57. The Map Act contains 177 sections divided into seven chapters, including general
provisions and definitions (§§ 66410-66424.6), requirements for and content of maps
(§§ 66245-66450), procedures for subdivision approval (§§ 66451-66472.1), requirements
and conditions of subdivision approval (§§ 66473-66498), improvement security (§§ 66499-
66499.10), reversions and exclusions (§§ 66499.11-66499.29), and enforcement and judicial
review (§§ 66499.30-66499.37).
58. Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 638, 318 P.2d 561, 565 (1957). See
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66411 (West Supp. 1982).
59. Hoover v. Kern County, 118 Cal. App. 2d 139, 142, 257 P.2d 492, 494 (1953). See
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66411 (West Supp. 1982); Benny v. City of Alameda, 105 Cal. App. 3d
1006, 1011, 164 Cal. Rptr. 776, 778-79 (1980).
60. CAL. GOVT CODE § 66426 (West Supp. 1982).
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authority.61
The Map Act is a form of enabling legislation authorizing cities
and counties to adopt conforming ordinances to implement its provi-
sions.6u However, the Act limits local lawmaking power to enactments
which are specifically or impliedly authorized by the Act. 63 Express
limitations on local government power to condition map approval on
the payment of fees or the dedication of land exist in the Map Act itself.
Chief among the limitations is the requirement that there be a reason-
able relationship between the payment or dedication and the infra-
structure needs generated by the subdivision.64  This restriction is
expressed in the Map Act's requirement that local ordinances be lim-
ited to the regulation of the design and improvement of subdivisions,
65
as these terms are specifically defined.6 6 State and federal constitu-
tional guarantees of equal protection and due process, of course, fur-
ther limit local power.67
The kind of local ordinance authorized by the Map Act is one
"regulating the design and improvements of subdivisions, insofar as the
provisions of the ordinance are consistent with and not in conflict with
the provisions of this division."68 The distinction between "design" and
"improvement" intended by the legislature is not entirely clear. "De-
sign" includes such matters as street alignments, grades and widths,
drainage and sanitary facilities and utilities, location and size of ease-
ments and rights of way, fire roads, lot sizes, traffic access, grading, and
land to be dedicated for park or recreational purposes. 69 "Improve-
ment" refers to street work, utilities, and other such items necessary for
61. Id. at § 66499.30.
62. Id. at § 66411.
63. Id. at § 66421; see Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 37, 207 P.2d
1, 5 (1949).
64. This rule is rooted in the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions,
which prohibit government from depriving the subdivider of his or her property without just
compensation. U.S. CONST. amends. V and XIV; CAL. CONST. art. 1 § 14. The subdividers'
argument is that by requiring them to dedicate land or pay fees not required by the subdivi-
sion itself, the city forces subdividers to pay for facilities enjoyed by the city as a whole,
which should rightfully be underwritten by all citizens.
65. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66411 (West Supp. 1982).
66. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
67. U.S. CONsT. amends. V and XIV; CAL. CONST. art. I § 14; see Associated Home
Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal
dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (197 1); Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d
1 (1949).
68. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66421 (West Supp. 1982).
69. Id. at § 66418. "Design" also includes "such other specific requirements in the plan
and configuration of the entire subdivision as may be necessary or convenient to insure
conformity to or implementation of the general plan. . . or any specific plan. . . ." Id.
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the general use of lot owners in the subdivision and neighborhood traf-
fic and drainage needs. 70 Although the definitions tend to merge, they
indicate that the subject matter of local legislation is to be the physical
nature of the subdivision.
The Map Act also authorizes local governments to exact fees as a
condition of subdivision approval for two general purposes: (1) to pay
for procedures required or authorized by the Map Act, such as costs of
processing tentative and final maps; and (2) to defray costs of construct-
ing specific public works made necessary by the development. 71 The
latter category includes fees in lieu of park dedication,72 and fees to
defray the cost of constructing drainage facilities, sanitary sewer facili-
ties, 73 bridges,74 and recharge facilities for the replenishment of the un-
derground water supply in the area benefited.75 Whenever such a fee is
authorized, the Map Act mandates a showing that the subdivision re-
quires the facility for which the fee is charged, and that the fees be
fairly apportioned, either on the basis of benefits conferred on, or the
need created by, the proposed subdivision.76
70. Id. at § 66419. "Improvement" also includes "such other specific improvements or
types of improvements ... necessary or convenient to insure conformity to or implementa-
tion of the general plan ... or any specific plan . " Id.
71. Id. at § 66451.2.
72. Id. at § 66477; see Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal.
3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (upholding the constitutionality of Government
Code § 66477), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971).
73. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66483 (West Supp. 1982).
74. Id. at § 66484.
75. Id. at § 66484.5.
76. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66483 (West Supp. 1982), authorizing fees to construct drainage
facilities, provides in pertinent part:
There may be imposed by local ordinance a requirement for the payment of
fees for purposes of defraying the actual or estimated costs of constructing planned
drainage facilities for the removal of surface and storm waters from local or neigh-
borhood drainage areas and of constructing planned sanitary sewer facilities for
local sanitary sewer areas, subject to the following conditions:
(d) The costs, whether actual or estimated, are based upon findings by the
legislative body which has adopted the local plan, that subdivision and develop-
ment of property within the planned local drainage area or local sanitary sewer
area will require construction of the facilities described in the drainage or sewer
plan, and that the fees are fairly apportioned within such areas either on the basis
of benefits conferred on property proposed for subdivision or on the need for such
facilities created by the proposed subdivision and development of other property
within such area.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66484 (West Supp. 1982), authorizing local governments to condition
map approval on payment of fees for the construction of bridges or major thoroughfares,
provides in pertinent part:
A local ordinance may require the payment of a fee as a condition of approval
of a final map or as a condition of issuing a building permit for purposes of de-
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The Map Act permits a local ordinance to require that improve-
ments installed by the subdivider for the benefit of the subdivision
"contain supplemental size, capacity or number for the benefit of prop-
erty not within the subdivision. . ... ,7 The Map Act also requires,
however, that the local agency reimburse the subdivider for the portion
of the cost of the improvement not expended to serve the subdivision's
needs.78
Finally, the Map Act lists the situations in which a local agency's
disapproval of a subdivision map would be required. A county or city
legislative body must disapprove the proposed map if certain findings
are made.79
B. The Kelber Doctrine
California courts have long recognized both the power granted to
local governments by the Map Act and the limitations on that power.
Thus, in the landmark case of Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 80
the California Supreme Court upheld a local planning commission's
fraying the actual or estimated cost of constructing bridges over waterways, rail-
ways, freeways, and canyons, or constructing major thoroughfares.
Such local ordinance may require payment of fees pursuant to this section if:
(c) The ordinance provides that. . . the boundaries of the area of benefit,
the costs, whether actual or estimated, and a fair method of allocation of costs to
the area of benefit and fee apportionment are established.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66484.5 (West Supp. 1982), authorizing fees for the construction of
ground water recharge facilities, provides in relevant part:
The legislative body of a local agency may adopt an ordinance requiring the
payment of a fee as a condition of approval of a subdivision requiring a final or
parcel map, or as a condition of issuing a building permit in an area of benefit
under a ground water recharge facility plan adopted as hereinafter provided, for
the purpose of constructing recharge facilities for the replenishment of the under-
ground water supply in such area of benefit.
Such local ordinance may require payment of fees pursuant to this section if,
at the time of payment:
...[The ground water recharge plan] shall include the boundaries of the area
of benefit, the availability of surface water, the planned facilities for the area of
benefit and the estimated cost thereof, a fair method of allocating the costs within
the area of benefit, and the apportionment of fees within such area.
77. Id. at § 66485.
78. Id. at § 66486.
79. Those situations include findings that (1) the proposed map is not consistent with
applicable general and specific plans; (2) the design or improvement of the proposed subdi-
vision is not consistent with applicable general and specific plans; (3) the site is not physi-
cally suitable for the type or proposed density of development; (4) the design of the
subdivision or proposed improvements is likely to cause substantial environmental damage
or public health problems; or (5) the design of the subdivision or proposed improvements
will conflict with public easements. Id. at § 66474.
80. 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
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requirement that a developer dedicate four specific areas of his pro-
posed subdivision for public street and highway purposes as a condi-
tion of map approval."' The developer argued that the dedications
were not expressly authorized by the Map Act because they were not
for new streets laid out in the subdivision by the developer, but for
extensions or widening of existing streets.82 The developer further con-
tended that, because the benefits conferred on the lot owners in the
subdivision would be slight, compared to the benefits to the city at
large, the conditions effected a taking of his property without just com-
pensation, in the guise of subdivision map proceedings.83
The supreme court in Ayres rejected this contention, concluding
that the dedication requirements were within the contemplation of the
Map Act, which, the court observed, requires that subdivision design
conform to local planning and zoning requirements. Without the dedi-
cations, the Ayres court reasoned, the subdivision would have been
"out of harmony with the neighborhood plan and traffic needs."8 4 The
court emphasized, however, that the conditions imposed by the com-
mission were reasonably related to needs created by the subdivision:
Where as here no specific restriction or limitation on the city's
power is contained in the charter, and none forbidding the
particular conditions is included either in the Subdivision
Map Act or the city ordinances, it is proper to conclude that
conditions are lawful which are not inconsistent with the map
act and the ordinances and are reasonabl y required by the
subdivision type and use as related to the character of the lo-
cal and neighborhood planning and traffic conditions.85
Ayres thus established two fundamental propositions: (1) The right of
a city to condition map approval upon dedication of land or payment
of a fee in lieu thereof, may be implied from the Map Act; and (2) the
conditions imposed must be reasonably related to needs generated by
the subdivision. 6
81. The areas required to be dedicated were (1) a ten-foot strip adjacent to a main
boulevard for purposes of widening the boulevard; (2) another ten-foot strip for planting
trees and shrubbery to insulate the subdivision from the boulevard; (3) an eighty-foot strip
for purposes of extending a street through the subdivision; and (4) a triangular island,
judged a traffic hazard by the commission, that had been created by the extension of another
street through the subdivision. Id. at 34-35, 207 P.2d at 3.
82. Id. at 37, 207 P.2d at 4-5.
83. Id. at 39-40, 207 P.2d at 6.
84. Id. at 40, 207 P.2d at 6.
85. Id. at 37, 207 P.2d at 5 (emphasis added).
86. See Note, Subdivision Exactions in California" Expansion of Municipal Power, 23
HASTINGs L.J. 403 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, Subdivision Exactions in California].
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The Ayres principles were applied by the court of appeal in Kelber
v. City of Upland 8 7 The Kelber court measured the requirements of
local ordinances against the test of Ayres to determine "whether they
bear such a reasonable relation to the requirements of the act that they
may properly be added as a condition precedent to the approval of
such a map.""8 The ordinances required developers to pay (1) a per-lot
fee into a fund to be used to acquire park and school sites in the city;
and (2) a per-acre fee into a fund to be used to build drainage facilities
outside the subdivision. The drainage fund contribution was in addi-
tion to a requirement that the subdivider build drainage facilities within
the subdivision adequate to serve its needs.8 9
In defense of the ordinances, the city argued that "such contribu-
tions to funds established for the general benefit of the city. . . [are] in
line with the modem tendency to extend the earlier concept of the po-
lice power. . . to include the broader field of general welfare. .... 90
The Kelber court concluded that the ordinances authorizing the fees
were inconsistent with the Map Act because they were intended not to
regulate the design and improvement of the subdivision, but to raise
Ayres has been widely cited by courts and commentators, some of which have found in the
following language support for the proposition that the city may require the developer to
pay for improvements to benefit the general public:
It is no defense to the conditions imposed in a subdivision map proceeding that
their fulfillment will incidentally also benefit the city as a whole. Nor is it a valid
objection to say that the conditions contemplate future as well as more immediate
needs. Potential as well as present population factors affecting the subdivision and
the neighborhood generally are appropriate for consideration.
34 Cal. 2d at 41, 207 P.2d at 7.
See, e.g., Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484
P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971); Bowden, Article XXVIII-Opening the Door to Open
Space Control, 1 PAC. L.J. 461, 482 (1970); Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionalty oflim-
posing Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exac-
tions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119, 1132-33 (1964).
The holding in Ayres limits the impact of these dicta, however. The conditions were
upheld in that case because they related directly to design and improvement needs created
by the subdivision, which made it possible to imply from the Map Act local power to impose
them. If the purpose of the dedication had been to benefit the city as a whole, or if the
dedication requirement bore no relationship to subdivision design and improvement, it
seems likely that the Ayres court, which defined the reasonableness standard, would have
found a taking of property without due process of law. See supra text accompanying note
85.
87. 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957).
88. Id. at 636, 318 P.2d at 564.
89. Id. at 633, 318 P.2d at 562. Subdividers were required to pay $30 per lot into the
park and school site fund and $99.07 per subdivision acre into the subdivision drainage
fund.
90. Id. at 635, 318 P.2d at 564.
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funds to meet the needs of the entire city.9' The court held:
The purpose and intent of the Subdivision Map Act is to pro-
vide for the regulation and control of the design and improve-
ment of a subdivision. . . , and not to provide funds for the
benefit of an entire city . .. [T]he power to require the pay-
ment of large fees or contributions for general city benefits as
a condition of the approval of a map may not reasonably be
implied [from the language of the Map Act], and it is entirely
inconsistent with the language and apparent intent of the stat-
ute. The imposition of such fees as the condition for the ap-
proval of such a map not only bears no relation to the
requirements indicated in the statute but would directly im-
pede the realization of what appears to be the intent and
meaning of the act.92
The Upland ordinances were part of the city's subdivision control
ordinance, enacted under authority derived from the Map Act. As pre-
viously observed, the Map Act grants cities power to regulate only sub-
division design and improvement. 93 Because the fees were not
reasonably required for subdivision design and improvement, the court
determined that they "materially change the requirements necessary
for the approval of a map as fixed by the Legislature," '94 and thus con-
fficted with the Map Act.95
Kelber's emphasis on whether a statute effects a material change in
the requirements for map approval was reiterated in a series of subse-
quent decisions in the courts of appeal.96 The most significant of those
decisions for purposes of understanding Pines is Newport Building Corp.
v. City of Santa Ana. 97
91. It rather clearly appears that these fee provisions are fund raising methods for
the purpose of helping to meet the future needs of the entire city for park and
school sites and drainage facilities, and that they are not reasonable requirements
for the design and improvement of the subdivision itself.
Id. at 638, 318 P.2d at 565.
92. Id.
93. See supra notes 62-79 and accompanying text.
94. 155 Cal. App. 2d at 636, 318 P.2d at 564.
95. Id. at 638, 318 P.2d at 566.
96. Benny v. City of Alameda, 105 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 164 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1980); Santa
Clara County Contractors Ass'n v. City of Santa Clara, 232 Cal. App. 2d 564, 43 Cal. Rptr.
86 (1965) (a municipality may not use the Map Act for general revenue-raising purposes);
Wine v. Council of Los Angeles, 177 Cal. App. 2d 157, 2 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1960) (proposed
conditions that subdividers pay disproportionate sewerage fee into city's general sewerage
fund and that they pay the cost of improving off-site streets did not come within definition of
design and improvement and, therefore, were not authorized by the Map Act).
97. 210 Cal. App. 2d 771, 26 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1962).
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Like Santa Monica, 98 the city of Santa Ana in Newport Building
deemed the payment upon which subdivision approval was condi-
tioned to be a business license tax99 and contended that the tax "was
solely for revenue purposes."' ' ° The one-time tax was imposed on
"[tihe business of subdividing land for residential occupancy" and was
measured at the rate of $50 per lot.' Its stated purpose was to offset
the financial burden that residential subdivisions place on the city.
Proceeds of the tax were paid into the city's general "Park and Fire-
house Acquisition and Construction Fund."'
' 0 2
Also like Santa Monica, the city of Santa Ana in Newport Building
asserted that its status as a charter city gave it the right to impose taxes
for revenue purposes, regardless of the provisions of the Map Act.'
0 3
98. See infra text accompanying notes 110-15.
99. Id. at 774, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
100. Id. at 775, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
101. Id. at 774, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 798 (quoting SANTA ANA, CAL., MUN. CODE art. 1, ch. 3,
§ 6200.55A (1956)).
102. 210 Cal. App. 2d at 775, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
103. Id. at 776, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 800. The argument against preemption in Pines turned
on the status of both Santa Monica and Santa Ana as charter cities, i.e., cities of a certain
designated population that have adopted charters for their own government under the au-
thority of the "home rule" provision of the California Constitution. CAL. CONST. art. XI,
§ 5. Section 5 empowers charter cities to "make and enforce all ordinances and regulations
in respect to municipal affairs, subject only to restrictions and limitations provided in their
several charters and in respect to other matters they shall be subject to general laws." Id,
(emphasis added). The laws of general law cities, such as Upland, are always subject to
preemption if they are found to conflict with state law, regardless of whether the local law
deals with "municipal affairs." Id.; Bishop v. City of San Jose, I Cal. 3d 56, 61, 460 P.2d
137, 140, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465, 468 (1969).
Accordingly, Santa Ana argued in Newport Building that local taxation was a "munici-
pal affair" within the meaning of § 5, and that therefore its business license tax ordinance
should prevail over the Map Act. 210 Cal. App. 2d at 776, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
Implicit in this argument is the further contention, urged by Santa Monica in Pines, that
Kelber should not control when a charter city's ordinance conflicts with state law because
Kelber, unlike Pines, involved a general law city that lacked the power over municipal af-
fairs possessed by charter cities. However, the charter city/general city debate is relevant
only to the question of preemption: whether, when state and local laws conflict, the state or
the local law should prevail.
In Newport Building the court held that the Map Act should prevail because the "provi-
sions of the state law cover the whole subject of regulation of subdivision except for matters
relating to design and improvement," and Santa Ana's ordinance did not relate to design
and improvement. Id. at 776-77, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 800. The Pines court, in contrast, con-
cluded that the Condominium Tax Law does not conflict with the Map Act; therefore, it
found it unnecessary to apply preemption analysis to determine which law should prevail.
For a general discussion of the debate surrounding municipal home rule in California, see
Sato, "MunicopalAffairs" in Calfornia, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1055 (1972); see also Comment,
The California Preemption Doctrine: Expanding the Regulatory Power ofLocal Governments,
8 U.S.F.L. REV. 728 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Comment: California Preemption Doctrine].
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The Newport Building court acknowledged Santa Ana's broad power as
a charter city to tax and upheld the city's right to impose license taxes
for the privilege of carrying on a business or profession.104 Neverthe-
less, the court held that when such a tax imposes a condition unrelated
to design and improvement, it "quite clearly confficts with the whole
plan of the Subdivision Map Act."'' 5 Accordingly, the tax was
invalidated.
0 6
The Newport Building court followed the reasoning of Kelber and
determined that the local tax ordinance materially changed the require-
ments for subdivision approval as fixed by the legislature. Kelber had
established the rule (the "Kelber doctrine" 107) that the power of subdi-
vision approval given to local governments by the Map Act was not
intended to be a general revenue-raising tool. 0 8 The court of appeal
agreed with the developers that Santa Ana had exercised its power over
subdivision design in a manner for which it was not designed, i.e., to
raise revenues. The court of appeal was unconvinced by the additional
argument, which assumed such importance in Pines, that an ordinance
conditioning approval on payment of a tax for revenue should receive
greater deference than an ordinance conditioning approval on payment
of a fee unauthorized by the Map Act. As in Kelber, the Newport
Building court focused on the conditioning of map approval; it held
that any ordinance that conditioned map approval in a manner unau-
thorized by the Map Act confficted with the Map Act, regardless of its
formal incidence or name. 1
0 9
C. The Condominium Tax Law
Since 1950, Santa Monica has had a subdivision map ordinance
enacted under the authority of the Map Act." 0 The Condominium
Tax Law, however, was not part of that ordinance, and the revenue
generated by the tax was not used to pay for facilities or services
needed by a particular subdivision. Rather, the tax was set forth in
section 6651 of the Santa Monica Municipal Code, which provided for
a "condominium business license tax" on the development and con-
struction of all condominium projects, whether newly constructed or
104. 210 Cal. App. 2d at 776-77, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
105. Id. at 777, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Pines, 29 Cal. 3d at 662, 630 P.2d at 524, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
108. 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 637-38, 318 P.2d 561, 565 (1957).
109. 210 Cal. App. 2d at 775-76, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 799-800.
110. SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 9300-9314 (1982).
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converted, in the sum of $1,000 per planned salable unit."' Section
6651 recited that the tax was "solely for revenue purposes."112 Pro-
ceeds from the tax were deposited in the city's general fund.'13
Section 6657 is the Condominium Tax Law's enforcement provi-
sion. In its original form it provided: "No permit for building, con-
struction, demolition, grading, subdividing, condominium construction,
condominium conversion, variance, conditional use or occupancy shall
be granted unless the license provided for in this Chapter is obtained
"114
In 1978, after the Pines trial court held that the Map Act pre-
empted the Condominium Tax Law, but before the supreme court's
reversal, Santa Monica amended section 6657 to eliminate its reference
to subdividing." 5 The present statute does not condition subdivision
map approval upon payment of the tax, but the Pines decision affirms
the city's right to do so.
V. ANALYSIS
A. Does the Map Act Preempt a Local Revenue-Raising Ordinance?
Plaintiffs in Pines contended that the Map Act effectively pre-
empted the field which the Condominium Tax Law sought to regulate.
The Pines court, with remarkably little attention to existing precedent,
rejected this contention and redefined the focus of analysis of both the
Map Act and the preemption issue.
Preemption analysis begins with the determination of whether a
conflict exists between state and local law. As enunciated by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Bishop v. City afSan Jose, "1 6 the question is
whether there is a "conflict between the regulations of state and of local
governments, or if the state legislation discloses an intent to preempt
the field to the exclusion of local regulation. . . . Only when the
court finds a conflict or evidence of legislative intent to preempt the
field does the preemption issue arise.
Legislative intent to preempt the field does not automatically de-
11. SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE art. 6, ch. 6B, § 6651 (1973).
112. Id.
113. 29 Cal. 3d at 658-59, 630 P.2d at 521, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
114. SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE art. 6, ch. 6B, § 6657 (1973) (emphasis added).
115. 29 Cal. 3d at 659 n.1, 630 P.2d at 522 n.1, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 337 n.l. See SANTA
MONICA, CAL., MuN. CODE art. 6, ch. 6B § 6657 (1978).
116. 1 Cal. 3d 56, 460 P.2d 137, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1969).
117. Id. at 62, 460 P.2d at 140, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 468. See also City of Santa Clara v. Von
Raesfeld, 3 Cal. 3d 239,474 P.2d 976,90 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1970); Century Plaza Hotel Co. v. City
of Los Angeles, 7 CaL App. 3d 616, 87 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1970).
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termine the outcome, however. If the court finds such a conflict or in-
tent to preempt, "the question becomes one of predominance or
superiority as between general state laws on the one hand and the local
regulations on the other." 1 8 This requires the court to determine
whether the subject of the conflicting state and local laws is a matter of
statewide concern or a "municipal affair" within the meaning of article
XI, section five of the California Constitution." 9 If the court deter-
mines that it is a municipal affair, the local law prevails despite evi-
dence of legislative intent to preempt.' 20 If the matter is determined to
be of statewide concern, however, legislative intent to preempt the field
to the exclusion of municipal regulation will be determinative, and the
local ordinance will be preempted by the state law at issue.'
2'
The issue as framed by the Pines court was the first step in pre-
118. 1 Cal. 3d at 62, 460 P.2d at 140, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
119. See supra note 103. CAL. CONST. art. XI § 5 provides:
(a) It shall be competent in any city charter to provide that the city governed
thereunder may make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in respect to mu-
nicipal affairs, subject only to restrictions and limitations provided in their several
charters and in respect to other matters they shall be subject to general laws. City
charters adopted pursuant to this Constitution shall supersede any existing charter,
and with respect to municipal affairs shall supersede all laws inconsistent
therewith.
See, e.g., Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 276, 291, 384
P.2d 158, 166-67, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830, 838-39 (1963); Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 366, 369-70,
125 P.2d 482, 484-85 (1942); Exparte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 209, 74 P. 780, 782-83 (1903).
The law relating to preemption has undergone substantial change in recent years. Prior
to Bishop, preemption had operated to permit the state to preempt a subject at will by adopt-
ing a scheme in an area where any statewide concern could be found. The term "municipal
affairs" had little significance because virtually any state legislation in an area established
sufficient interest to make the area one of statewide concern. See Comment, The Caifornia
Preemption Doctrine, supra note 103, at 738-40 (discussing Bishop v. City of San Jose, 1 Cal.
3d at 66, 460 P.2d at 144, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 472 (Peters, J., dissenting)). Bishop introduced the
requirement that a court balance the state's interest against the city's; a finding that the city's
interest is greater results in the conclusion that the subject is a "municipal affair" and be-
yond interference by the state, even though the state law has attempted to deal with the
subject on a statewide basis. 1 Cal. 3d at 62-63, 460 P.2d at 141, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 469. The
result of this new emphasis on "municipal affairs" has been that the majority of current
preemption cases involving charter cities revolve around the question of what constitutes a
municipal affair. See also Sato, supra note 103.
120. [T]he fact, standing alone, that the Legislature has attempted to deal with a
particular subject on a statewide basis is not determinative of the issue as between
state and municipal affairs, nor does it impair the constitutional authority of a
home rule city or county to enact and enforce its own regulations to the exclusion
of general laws if the subject is held by the courts to be a municipal affair.
Bishop v. City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d at 63, 460 P.2d at 141, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
121. 1 Cal. 3d at 61-62, 460 P.2d at 140, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 468. See also Sonoma County
Org. of Pub. Employees v. County of Sonoma, 23 Cal. 3d 296, 315-16, 591 P.2d 1, 12, 152
Cal. Rptr. 903, 914 (1979).
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emption analysis: whether state and local laws clash.122 Plaintiffs ar-
gued that a local ordinance unrelated to subdivision design and
improvement that conditions map approval on payments for the benefit
of the entire city, is inconsistent with the provisions of the Map Act.
1 23
They further argued, citing Newport Building, that the conflict occurs
regardless of whether the local ordinance purports to be a subdivision
regulation or a revenue raising measure.'24 The Pines court, however,
rejected the premises on which Newport Building and Kelber were
based, explaining that "Kelber and the cases following it contravene the
principle that a tax for revenue is not invalid simply because it condi-
tions the local exercise of a right or privilege articulated by the
state." 1
2 5
Underlying this explanation is a sharp shift in the focus of Map
Act analysis. The Pines court made it clear that henceforth the relevant
question is not whether a local law materially changes the requirements
for subdivision approval fixed by the legislature, but whether the local
law is a subdivision regulation or a tax for revenue. If the former label
applies, and the ordinance requires a fee unauthorized by the Map Act,
it conflicts with the Act. But if the ordinance exacts a tax for revenue, it
does not conflict even if its impact is identical to that of the forbidden
regulation. The Pines formula appears to signal a clear return to the
formalism rejected by earlier cases.
126
To marshal authority for its conclusion that the Condominium
Tax Law imposed a tax for revenue that did not conflict with the Map
Act, the Pines court was forced to search far afield of the Map Act
itself; Kelber and its progeny, together with other cases which have
construed the Map Act, obviously provided no support. The cases re-
lied upon by the Pines court fall into three categories: (1) decisions
finding no conflict between local business license taxes and state
schemes for regulating the conduct of businesses and professions; 27 (2)
a case upholding a local utility users' tax against claims that it con-
flicted with state laws governing utility regulation;12 and (3) narrow
122. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
123. Respondents' Brief at 15-16, The Pines v. City of Santa Monica, 108 Cal. App. 3d
577, 166 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1980), vacated, 29 Cal. 3d 656, 630 P.2d 521, 175 Cal. Rptr. 336
(1981).
124. Id. at 18-19.
125. 29 Cal. 3d at 660, 630 P.2d at 522-23, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
126. See supra text accompanying note 109.
127. In re Groves, 54 Cal. 2d 154, 351 P.2d 1028, 4 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1960); In re Galusha,
184 Cal. 697, 195 P. 406 (1921); Marsh & McLennan, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 62 Cal.
App. 3d 108, 132 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1976).
128. Rivera v. City of Fresno, 6 Cal. 3d 132, 490 P.2d 793, 98 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1971).
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judicial constructions of state laws or constitutional provisions that pro-
scribe local use of certain tax methods.1
29
The rationale underlying the first category of cases, the business
license decisions, is that "the imposition of an occupational tax by a
municipality upon those engaged in [occupations the state has licensed]
is not an interference with state affairs."1 30 The court apparently con-
cluded, albeit without explanation, that the Map Act is equivalent to a
business licensing scheme and thus should be subject to the type of
construction normally applied to such schemes. The court also as-
sumed, again without analysis, that the Condominium Tax Law was a
valid business license tax which Santa Monica, as a charter city, was
constitutionally empowered to impose. As this note will explain,' 3 '
these assumptions are not well-founded.
The second and third categories of cases '32 relied upon by the
Pines court also provide little support for the court's finding of no con-
flict. In each case, the particular court scrutinized the applicable state
statute for evidence of legislative intent to occupy the field to the exclu-
sion of local legislation. 3 3 Finding no such evidence, these courts
found no conflict. These decisions, however, as shall be explained, 
3
cannot justify the Pines court's finding of no conflict because the Pines
court did not examine the language and purposes of the Map Act.
1. Analogy of the Map Act to state business licensing schemes
The licensing and regulation of businesses and professions under
California law is governed by several legislative enactments, including
the Business and Professions Code,135 the Health and Safety Code
36
and the Insurance Code. 37 Among the purposes ascribed to these li-
censing statutes is the protection of the public. 38 In keeping with this
129. Weekes v. City of Oakland, 21 Cal. 3d 386, 579 P.2d 449, 146 Cal. Rptr. 558 (1978);
A.B.C. Distrib. Co. v. City of San Francisco, 15 Cal. 3d 566, 542 P.2d 625, 125 Cal. Rptr. 465
(1975); Ainsworth v. Bryant, 34 Cal. 2d 465, 211 P.2d 564 (1949).
130. In re Galusha, 184 Cal. 697, 699, 195 P. 406, 407 (1921).
131. See infra notes 156-89 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 128 & 129.
133. See infra notes 191-212 and accompanying text.
134. See infra notes 191-227 and accompanying text.
135. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 1-25761 (West 1964 & Supp. 1982).
136. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1-53113 (West 1979 & Supp. 1982).
137. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1-14099 (West 1972 & Supp. 1982).
138. For a discussion of the rationales underlying state licensing of occupations, see
Moore, The Purpose of Licensing, 4 J. L. & EcoN. 93 (1961). The author suggests three
public welfare rationales: (1) uniform licensing procedures provide consumers with accurate
information necessary to decision making; (2) society knows better than the individual what
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purpose, a typical licensing chapter in the Business and Professions
Code defines, among other things, the persons to be licensed, proce-
dures for licensing, license fees, and disciplinary proceedings for viola-
tions of the chapter.
39
In In re Galusha, 140 which provided primary support for the
court's holding in Pines, the supreme court addressed the issue whether
the city of Los Angeles could impose an occupational tax upon attor-
neys licensed by the State Bar. The plaintiff in that case argued that
local taxation of his profession interfered with the state's regulation of
that profession and, therefore, was preempted by state law. 4 ' The
Galusha court rejected this contention, stating:
The municipality, in imposing an occupational tax upon at-
torneys, is not interfering with state regulations, for it is not
attempting to prescribe qualifications for attorneys different
from or additional to those prescribed by the state. It is
merely providing for an increase in its revenue by imposing a
tax upon those who, by pursuing their profession within its
limits, are deriving benefits from the advantages especially af-
forded by the city.'
42
Similarly, in In re Groves, 143 the supreme court upheld a city busi-
ness license fee of $100 per year imposed for revenue purposes on the
operator of a milk processing plant despite the existence of state stat-
utes regulating the licensing of his business. 44Relying on the rationale
of In re Galusha, the Groves court held that because the city license tax
had no regulatory purpose and was strictly revenue-raising in charac-
ter, it did not conflict with the state regulatory scheme.14
Although the Pines court cited Groves and Galusha, 146 it failed to
explain the applicability of their reasoning to Pines. In fact, the analogy
is tenuous. The business of subdividing land is'not a profession or
business which is licensed by the state in the manner in which the state
licenses the practice of law or the manufacture of milk products.
is good for the individual; and (3) society cannot afford to condone low standards of busi-
ness and professional conduct by tolerating them. .d. at 103.
139. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE div. 9 (alcoholic beverages), div. 3, ch. 9
(contractors).
140. 184 Cal. 697, 195 P. 406 (1921).
141. Id. at 698, 195 P. at 406.
142. Id. at 699, 195 P. at 407.
143. 54 Cal. 2d 154, 351 P.2d 1028, 4 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1960).
144. Id. at 156-58, 351 P.2d at 1030-31, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 846-47.
145. Id. at 157-58, 351 P.2d at 1031, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
146. 29 Cal. 3d at 660-61, 630 P.2d at 523, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
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The general rule governing the relationship between state regula-
tion and local taxation is that "[a] particular matter may be a state af-
fair and exclusively subject to state regulation but yet not immune from
local taxation for revenue purposes where the tax does not interfere
with the field preempted by the state."' 47 As applied to state regulation
of businesses or occupations, the rule has been construed to mean that
a local occupational tax does not interfere with state regulation of the
business because it does not "prescribe qualifications . . . different
from or additional to those prescribed by the state." 148 The state's in-
terest in regulating businesses and professions extends only to assuring
that certain standards are met, which it does by means of licensing and
disciplinary procedures. The state has little interest in protecting its
licensed businesses and professions from municipal taxation.1
49
The state interest underlying the Map Act is distinguishable, how-
ever, from that underlying the regulation of businesses and professions.
The Map Act does not purport to regulate the conduct of subdividers,
as, for instance, the Real Estate Law 50 regulates the conduct of real
estate developers and brokers. The Map Act was not designed to pro-
tect the public against ill-trained or unscrupulous subdividers; it estab-
lishes no licensing procedures, license fees or disciplinary proceedings
for subdividers.
The purpose of the Map Act is to create and define the balance of
authority between state and local regulation of subdivisions.' That
authority originates in the state's police power. 5 2 By virtue of the Map
Act, the state delegates certain authority to local governments-but
only the authority to regulate subdivision design and improvement;
5 3
it does not authorize cities to ban subdivision development entirely or
147. Ainsworth v. Bryant, 34 Cal. 2d 465, 477, 211 P.2d 564, 571 (1949).
148. In re Galusha, 184 Cal. at 699, 195 P. at 407.
149. For example, no such interest is expressed in the provisions of the Business & Profes-
sions Code that establish licensing procedures for attorneys. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§§ 6000-6228 (West 1974 & Supp. 1982).
150. The conduct of real estate developers and brokers is governed by CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE §§ 10000-10602 [hereinafter cited as the Real Estate Law]. It should be noted that
before the reenactment of the Map Act in Title 7 (Planning and Land Use) of the Govern-
ment Code in 1974, it was codified in the Real Estate Division of the Business & Professions
Code. The Real Estate Division consists of two sections: "Licensing of Persons" (§§ 10000-
10602) and "Regulation of Transactions" (§§ 11000-11709), which included the Map Act.
Thus, even when it was contained within the Business and Professions Code, the Map Act
was not considered a business licensing statute.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 13-16.
152. See generall, Anderson, supra note 8, at § 7.01; Note, Subdivision Exactions in Cali-
fornia, supra note 86.
153. See supra notes 62-79 and accompanying text.
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to condition subdivision map approval on payment of fees unrelated to
needs generated by the subdivision.5 4 The Map Act narrowly defines
the burdens a local government may impose on the process of subdivi-
sion by specifying the types of payment the city may require as prereq-
uisites to map approval.1
55
The state's interest in creating and maintaining a balance of au-
thority between state and local interests is thus of a different character
from its interest in regulating businesses and professions. The state ar-
guably has a strong interest in protecting subdividers from local taxa-
tion because local taxation places a burden on subdividing
unauthorized by the Map Act. Accordingly, judicial determinations
that local taxes do not interfere with state schemes for regulating the
conduct of businesses and professions do not provide a reasonable basis
for concluding that the Condominium Tax Law does not interfere with
the Map Act. The existence or nonexistence of a conflict can be discov-
ered only with reference to the Act itself.
2. The Condominium Tax Law: Tax for revenue or subdivision
regulation?
Even if the Map Act were sufficiently analogous to state licensing
schemes to support the conclusion that a local tax found not to conflict
with such a state scheme would also not conflict with the Map Act, the
Pines court did not convincingly demonstrate that the Condominium
Tax Law imposed a legitimate business license tax rather than a subdi-
vision regulation masquerading as a tax. This distinction is critical be-
cause, unlike the power of a city to regulate state-regulated businesses,
"the city's right to tax the privilege of employment is virtually beyond
dispute .... "56
The traditional distinction between a license fee imposed under
the police power for regulatory purposes and a tax imposed under the
tax power is well understood. 15 7 A regulatory license fee is intended to
finance the enforcement of regulation, and does not exceed the neces-
sary expense of issuing the license and regulating the business it cov-
154. Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 638, 318 P.2d 561, 566 (1957).
Kelber was disapproved in Pines only to the extent that it implies limitations on local tax
power, not to the extent that it limits local power to regulate subdivisions. 29 Cal. 3d at 664,
630 P.2d at 525, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
155. See supra notes 71-76.
156. Weekes v. City of Oakland, 21 Cal. 3d 386, 396, 579 P.2d 449, 454, 146 Cal. Rptr.
558, 563 (1978).
157. 9 E. MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 26.15 (3d ed. 1978).
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ers.' 58 A tax, on the other hand, is imposed solely for revenue purposes
and has no regulatory features. 159 The name an exaction bears is im-
material in determining whether it is a fee or a tax; its substantive pro-
visions determine its character.
60
The Condominium Tax Law was carefully drafted to bear all the
indicia of a tax measure: (1) it was designated a revenue-raising meas-
ure; (2) it contained no obvious regulatory provisions; and (3) the reve-
nue it generated was placed in the general revenue fund. 61 Yet the
Condominium Tax had two regulatory features that distinguish it from
the local taxes upheld in the cases cited in Pines, and also from business
license taxes in general.
First, as a one-time, per-unit fee, the Condominium Tax Law was
not as clearly imposed on the privilege of doing work in the jurisdiction
as were the ongoing business taxes under scrutiny in the cases relied
upon in Pines. In re Galusha 62 involved an annual tax on the practice
of law, In re Groves 63 an annual tax on the business of operating a
milk products plant, and Marsh & McLennan, Inc. v. City of Los Ange-
les' 64 an annual tax on the commission revenues of insurers. Because
these taxes are measured by ongoing business activity, they appear to
tax the business done in the jurisdiction. The Condominium Tax, on
the other hand, is a flat charge on each unit. 65 This gives it the appear-
ance of a subdivision fee, which is often levied on a per-unit or per-lot
basis.'
66
This is not to say, of course, that an occupation or business tax
cannot be imposed on the business of constructing homes. In City of
Los Angeles v. Rancho Homes, Inc., 167 the supreme court held that a
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Ainsworth v. Bryant, 34 Cal. 2d 465, 211 P.2d 564 (1949).
161. See MCQUILLAN, supra note 157, at § 26.16.
162. 184 Cal. 697, 195 P. 406 (1921).
163. 54 Cal. 2d 154, 351 P.2d 1028, 4 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1960).
164. 62 Cal. App. 3d 108, 132 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1976).
165. 29 Cal. 3d at 658, 630 P.2d at 521, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
166. See, e.g., Santa Clara County Contractors Ass'n v. City of Santa Clara, 232 Cal.
App. 2d 564,43 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1965) ($25 for each dwelling unit); Kelber v. City of Upland,
155 Cal. App. 2d 631,318 P.2d 561 (1957) ($30 per lot). That Santa Monica itself recognized
the similarity of the Condominium Tax Law to a subdivision regulation is indicated by the
city's alternative argument to the trial court: that the Condominium Tax Law was a "per-
missible subdivision exaction" which was "essential for effective implementation of the state
regulatory scheme." Respondents' Brief at 5, The Pines v. City of Santa Monica, 108 Cal.
App. 3d 577, 166 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1980), vacated, 29 Cal. 3d 656, 630 P.2d 521, 175 Cal. Rptr.
336 (1981).
167. 40 Cal. 2d 764, 256 P.2d 305 (1953).
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city's business license tax ordinance, which imposed an annual gross
receipts tax on all businesses, trades and professions, was applicable to
a plaintiff engaged in the development and sale of real property. The
tax in Rancho Homes, however, was clearly recognizable as a business
tax because gross receipts are widely used as the measure of business
and occupation taxes.
68
Two California court of appeal decisions lend support to the Pines
court's assumption that the Condominium Tax Law, although imposed
as a one-time, one-payment fee, was a legitimate business tax. In Asso-
ciated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Newark, 69 the court of appeal
upheld a tax on the business of constructing residential units measured
by the number of bedrooms in each dwelling. The city required the tax
to be paid as a prerequisite to issuance of a building permit for the unit.
The court held that the tax was not an attempt to regulate the issuance
of building permits, but was a valid business license tax.
170
Weso'eld-Palos Verdes Co. v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes'I" in-
volved a similar business tax. In that case, the court of appeal upheld
the business tax despite an admittedly regulatory purpose: the city im-
posed an "environmental excise tax," measurable at the rate of $500
per bedroom, on the construction of new dwellings. 172 The purpose of
the tax was to offset the damage to the ecology and environment of the
city occasioned by a local boom in housing construction.173 The city's
ordinances also established a business license tax, but imposed it only
on those developers who had not paid the environmental excise tax.
This enabled the court to conclude that the environmental excise tax
was, effectively, a business license tax. 174 While acknowledging that
the environmental excise tax had an underlying regulatory purpose,
viz., to aid the city in coping with the environmental problems occa-
sioned by major development projects, 175 the court nevertheless held
that the tax was not a regulatory scheme because the declaredpurpose
of the tax was "strictly that of raising revenue."'
' 76
The supreme court in Pines could have extended the reasoning of
168. Weekes v. City of Oakland, 21 Cal. 3d 386, 394, 579 P.2d 449, 453, 146 Cal. Rptr.
558, 562 (1978) ("The gross receipts occupation tax has a venerable history as a revenue-
raising measure for California cities.").
169. 18 Cal. App. 3d 107, 95 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1971).
170. Id. at 111, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
171. 73 Cal. App. 3d 486, 141 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1977).
172. Id. at 491 n.2, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 39 n.2.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 492, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
175. Id. at 497, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
176. Id.
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these bedroom tax decisions to support a conclusion that the one-time
tax imposed on each unit by the Condominium Tax Law did not oper-
ate as a regulation. This is particularly so because the Condominium
Tax Law, unlike the tax upheld in Weseld-Palos Verdes, had no
avowedly regulatory purpose. The court did not rely on these cases,
however. Instead, the court by analogy appears to have implicitly ex-
tended the definition of a valid business license tax on development
and construction to businesses completely unrelated to development
and construction.
The Condominium Tax Law's other regulatory feature is the con-
ditioning of subdivision approval on payment of the tax. This is, of
course, the feature that led the court of appeal in Newport Building to
ignore the usual distinction between a regulation and a tax for revenue
in the context of the Map Act. 7 7 In Pines, the supreme court held that
the conditioning feature was not regulatory in nature, but merely a
means of revenue enforcement: "The power to tax includes power to
prescribe reasonable means of enforcement."1 78 By a somewhat
strained analogy, the court equated the conditioning aspect of the Con-
dominium Tax Law with the requirement that a business that is taxed
by the city must obtain a registration certificate;179 or that a retailer
"collect" a retail sales tax from his customers;18 0 or that a contractor
display a sticker on his automobile as evidence that he had paid a local
business tax.1
8 1
The Pines court's comparisons ignored the specific requirements of
the Map Act. Local power to condition map approval is at the heart of
the Map Act, as are the restrictions of that power to certain limited
circumstances.'8 2 The court's dismissal of the Condominium Tax
Law's conditioning feature, by analogy to an automobile sticker re-
quirement, also overlooked the regulatory effect of the requirement:
construction of the project cannot proceed until the tax is paid.
The court need not have relied on such unlikely analogies. The
same decisions that would have supported the court's implicit conclu-
sion that a tax payable as a one-time, lump-sum charge against the
property is a legitimate business tax would also have strengthened the
177. See supra text accompanying notes 98-109.
178. 29 Cal. 3d at 663, 630 P.2d at 524, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 339 (citations omitted).
179. City of Los Angeles v. A.E.C. Los Angeles, 33 Cal. App. 3d 933, 940, 109 Cal. Rptr.
519, 524 (1973).
180. Ainsworth v. Bryant, 34 Cal. 2d 465, 211 P.2d 564 (1949).
181. Arnke v. City of Berkeley, 185 Cal. App. 2d 842, 848-49, 8 Cal. Rptr. 645, 648-49
(1960).
182. See supra notes 63-79 and accompanying text.
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court's treatment of the conditioning requirement. In Associated Home
Builders, Inc. v. City ofNewark, 18 3 the court of appeal rejected an asser-
tion that conditioning the issuance of a building permit upon payment
of the city's construction tax conflicted with the state Health and Safety
Code's limitation of building permit fees to those which cover the costs
of issuing permits."s Like the Pines court, the court in Associated
Home Builders designated the payment a tax, not a regulatory fee, and
observed that the requirement that the tax be paid before the building
permit was issued "represents merely a choice of a reasonable time for
payment of a tax validly imposed."
'1 85
In Wesfield-Palos Verdes Co. v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes,'86
the court of appeal reached the same conclusion with regard to the en-
vironmental excise/business license tax at issue in that case. 18 7 The
court stated that 'the requirement that the excise tax be paid before
occupancy is permitted, while regulatory in character, is imposed sim-
ply as a means of enforcement of the tax, and does not alter the overall
character as a revenue measure."'' 8
The courts' analyses in Associated Home Builders and Wesofeld
Palos Verdes were similar in one respect to that of the supreme court in
Pines. they overlooked the regulatory effect of conditioning permission
to engage in a taxed business. This effect, however, is particularly sig-
nificant in Pines because of the interaction of the local law with the
Map Act and its many directives regarding the conditioning of map
approval. The legislature's clearly voiced intention that map approval
be conditioned only in certain limited circumstances underscores the
weakness of the Pines court's conclusion that, in conditioning map ap-
proval upon payment of the tax, the city was merely prescribing a rea-
sonable means of collecting the tax. 189
The original observation that requiring a contractor to display an
automobile sticker is merely a means of revenue enforcement' 90 grew,
through Pines, into a powerful rule that threatens to impair the pur-
poses of the Map Act. The court's failure to explain adequately why
the Condominium Tax Law should not be viewed as a subdivision reg-
183. 18 Cal. App. 3d 107, 95 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1971).
184. Id. at 110, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 649-50.
185. Id. at I11, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
186. 73 Cal. App. 3d 486, 141 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1977).
187. See supra notes 171-76 and accompanying text.
188. 73 Cal. App. 3d at 497, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 44 (citing Arnke v. City of Berkeley, 185
Cal. App. 2d 842, 8 Cal. Rptr. 645 (1960)).
189. See supra notes 63-79 and accompanying text.
190. See supra text accompanying note 181.
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ulation, but rather as a valid business license tax, detracts from the per-
suasiveness of its conclusion that the tax did not conflict with the Map
Act. It emphasizes the need to examine the requirements of the Map
Act itself.
3. The requirements of the Map Act
To determine whether a municipal ordinance conflicts with state
law, a court must examine the state law for evidence of intent to occupy
the field to the exclusion of local legislation. 91 This process requires
analysis of the statute's language, its legislative history, and the cases
construing it.' 92 The Pines court considered and rejected previous judi-
cial constructions of the Map Act's intent (the "Kelber doctrine"),
1 93
and also considered and rejected the argument that the Map Act's legis-
lative history supports a conclusion that the legislature intended the
Act to occupy the field of subdivision approval except on issues of de-
sign and improvement. 194 The Pines court did not, however, examine
191. Bishop v. City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d at 62, 460 P.2d at 140, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
192. Bishop addressed the issue whether the legislature intended California's prevailing
wage laws to control the setting of city employees' salaries. The court first examined the
language of the wage statute and concluded that it was intended to apply only to privately
contracted public work. 1 Cal. 3d at 64, 460 P.2d at 142, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 470. The court
found further support for its position in the history of the statute and in an earlier judicial
interpretation of the statute's language. Id. at 64-65, 460 P.2d at 142-43, 81 Cal. Rptr. at
470-71; see also A.B.C. Distrib. Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 15 Cal. 3d 566, 542
P.2d 625, 125 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1975); Ainsworth v. Bryant, 34 Cal. 2d 465, 211 P.2d 564
(1949); Marsh & McLennan, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. App. 3d 108, 132 Cal. Rptr.
796 (1976).
193. See supra notes 87-109 and accompanying text.
194. It is not entirely clear why the court rejected this argument. The relevant history can
be summarized as follows:
In 1971 and 1972, the legislature considered and rejected two proposed bills (S. 1118,
Reg. Sess. (1972); A. 1374, Reg. Sess. (1971)), which, if passed, would have restricted the
authority of state government under the Map Act. Both bills would have amended what is
now CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66411 to provide as follows:
The Legislature declares that in enacting this chapter it intends to regulate only
those matters in which statewide uniformity is needed, as provided herein, in order
that local agencies may exercise the maximum degree of control over divisions of
real property within their respective jurisdictions and to insure that land develop-
ment is in accordance with local planning policy.
Section 66411 is the Map Act section that vests power in local governments to regulate sub-
division design and improvement. No language limiting state power appears in § 66411 in
its present form.
As the supreme court noted in Pines, the proposed changes were only parts of bills
seeking to recodify the Map Act--an effort finally successful in 1974, with the Act's recodifi-
cation in the Government Code. 29 Cal. 3d at 663, 630 P.2d at 524, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
From this, the court concluded that the failure to adopt the amendments did not indicate
intent on the part of the legislature to limit local tax power. Id. Nevertheless, the proposed
textual changes represented significant policy changes the legislature could hardly have
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the terms of the Map Act itself. Its failure to do so distinguishes Pines
from the four decisions cited by the court for the proposition that "Cal-
ifornia courts also have been ready in other contexts to uphold local
taxes against arguments that they conflict with state regulation."' 95 In
all four decisions, the courts were able to conclude that no conflict ex-
isted only after analyzing the language and purpose of the state law.
In Weekes v. City of Oakland, 196 the supreme court was called
upon to decide whether the city of Oakland could properly levy a tax
on wages earned within the city by nonresidents employed in the
city. 197 The plaintiffs in Weekes contended that the tax was a munici-
pal income tax barred by the Revenue and Taxation Code. 19 8 The
Weekes court distinguished Oakland's tax from income taxes that had
run afoul of the state prohibition, likening it instead to a gross receipts
business license tax. This characterization enabled the court to con-
clude that there was no conflict because the Revenue and Taxation
overlooked. Furthermore, the recodified Map Act does not contain the changes proposed in
1971 and 1972.
Plaintiffs further argued that because Kelber, Newport Bldg., and their progeny were
decided before the Map Act's revision and reenactment in the Government Code in 1974,
and because the Map Act was not materially changed at that time, the legislature intended to
ratify the Kelber doctrine. Id. at 662, 630 P.2d at 523-24, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 339. They in-
voked the following canon of interpretation:
Statutes are to be interpreted by assuming that the Legislature was aware of the
existing judicial decisions. . . .Moreover, failure to make changes in a given stat-
ute in a particular respect when the subject is before the Legislature and changes
are made in other respects, is indicative of an intention to leave the law unchanged
in that respect.
Bishop v. City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d at 65, 460 P.2d at 143, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 471 (citations
omitted).
The Pines court found this doctrine inapplicable in that case because
[t]he Map Act's words do not deal with local taxes, and there is no evidence that
the matter was before the Legislature in 1974. . . .We should not infer that, be-
cause the Legislature when it reenacted a comprehensive statute failed to address
this specific topic, it intended to preempt local subdivision taxes.
29 Cal. 3d at 662, 630 P.2d at 524, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 339 (citations omitted).
Although the subject of local taxes was not "before the Legislature" in 1974, Kelber and
Newport Building had served as important limitations on local power to condition subdivi-
sion map approval since 1957 and 1962, respectively. Newport Bldg. did, in fact, limit local
tax power. The canon suggests that these decisions were before the legislature in 1974. Al-
though it would be unwise to conclude, from the legislative history of the Map Act alone,
that the legislature intended the Kelber/Newpor Bldg. construction to stand, that history
provides more convincing evidence of such intent than the Pines court was willing to
recognize.
195. 29 Cal. App. 3d at 661, 630 P.2d at 523, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
196. 21 Cal. 3d 386, 579 P.2d 449, 146 Cal. Rptr. 558 (1978).
197. Id. at 390, 579 P.2d at 450, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
198. Id. Revenue & Taxation Code § 17041.5 prohibits the imposition of income taxes
by any local government. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17041.5 (West 1970).
THE PINES V CITY OF SANTA MONICA
Code specifically exempted from the income tax prohibition business
license taxes measured by gross receipts.199 The court found that, far
from being in conflict with the state law, Oakland's tax was "expressly
authorized" by the state law.200
The supreme court used similar reasoning in Rivera v. City of
Fresno20 ' to uphold a users' tax levied by the city of Fresno on all those
who used gas, electricity, and telephone services in the city. Plaintiffs
claimed that the local tax conflicted with the requirements of the state
uniform local sales and use tax law, the Bradley-Bums Act,2 2 by re-
quiring a tax in addition to that authorized by the state law.20 3 How-
ever, the Bradley-Bums Act contains a loophole provision specifying
that it is not intended to prohibit the local levying of any tax "substan-
tially different" from those authorized by the Act.2° The Rivera court
determined that Fresno's utility users' tax was "substantially different"
because the state scheme was intended to require uniform local sales
taxes on personal property, not utility services.2°5 As a "substantially
different tax," the utility users' tax was not in conflict with the state
regulatory scheme.20 6
InAinsworth v. Bryant,20 7 the state law in question was article XX,
section 22 of the California Constitution, which conferred upon the
state legislature exclusive power to license and regulate the manufac-
ture, sale, purchase, possession, and transportation of alcoholic bever-
ages within the state. 08 Plaintiff, a retail liquor dealer, maintained that
this constitutional delegation of power precluded the city of San Fran-
cisco from enforcing a local retail sales tax against him.20 9 A thorough
analysis of the language of article XX, section 22 and its legislative
history convinced the supreme court that the two laws did not conflict:
the constitutional language empowered the state only to collect license
fees or occupation taxes. The court stated: "In thus delineating and
limiting the specific, exclusive taxing power of the state. . . , it would
appear . . . that no further exclusive power of taxation was
199. 21 Cal. 3d at 390, 579 P.2d at 450, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
200. Id. at 391, 579 P.2d at 451, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 560.
201. 6 Cal. 3d 132, 490 P.2d 793, 98 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1971).
202. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 7200-7212 (West 1974 & Supp. 1981).
203. 6 Cal. 3d at 137, 490 P.2d at 795-96, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 283-84.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 137-38, 490 P.2d at 796, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 284.
206. Id.
207. 34 Cal. 2d 465, 211 P.2d 564 (1949).
208. Id. at 468, 211 P.2d at 565.
209. Id.
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intended."21 0
Similarly, in. A.B.C Distributing Co. v. City of San Francisco,2 1' the
court employed the same reasoning to uphold the application of a local
payroll tax to wholesale liquor distributors. Because the tax in question
was not an occupation tax on liquor dealers, but a tax applied to all
businesses with employees who performed services in the city and
county, it did not conflict with the regulatory provisions of article XX,
section 22.2 12
Ainsworth and A.B. C Distributing Co. illustrate the kind of analy-
sis required to determine whether a local ordinance conflicts with a
state law. Although Weekes2 13 and Rivera21 4 involve construction of
loophole provisions, they also reflect concern for the requirements of
the state law with which the local law in question is alleged to clash.
The Pines court, in contrast, virtually ignored the provisions of the
Map Act. At only one point in the Pines opinion did the court address
the language of the Act, and then only to observe that "[t]he Map Act
contains no language granting or limiting local tax power. '21 5 While
this is true, it begs the question raised by Kelber and the cases following
it: to what extent does the Map Act restrict local power to burden the
subdivision of land by any means?
Because the Map Act contains no language granting or limiting
local tax power, the Pines court could find no evidence of legislative
intent to limit local tax power. The court stated: "Because the tax
power is so fundamental, state intent to preempt it must be clear.
'216
The Pines court explicitly rejected the Kelber/Newport Building deter-
mination that the Map Act was intended to limit local tax power.2 1 7 It
also rejected the confirmation of such an intent arguably present in the
Map Act's legislative history.21 8 This reasoning suggests that only an
express statement of legislative intent to limit local tax power would
have persuaded the Pines court that the Map Act was intended to pre-
empt local ordinances like the Condominium Tax Law, and that, there-
fore, the two laws conflict.
California decisions, however, have rejected the notion that pre-
210. Id. at 473, 211 P.2d at 568.
211. 15 Cal. 3d 566, 542 P.2d 625, 125 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1975).
212. Id. at 572, 542 P.2d at 628, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
213. See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 201-06 and accompanying text.
215. 29 Cal. 3d at 663, 630 P.2d at 524, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
216. Id. at 662, 630 P.2d at 524, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
217. Id. at 664, 630 P.2d at 525, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
218. See supra note 194.
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emption depends upon a strict conflict between the wording of a local
ordinance and a state legislative enactment. The general rule was
stated by the supreme court in Tolman v. Underhill"19 "Where the
Legislature has adopted statutes governing a particular subject matter,
its intent with regard to occupying the field to the exclusion of all local
regulation is not to be measured alone by the language used but by the
whole purpose and scope of the legislative scheme."
220
Had the Pines court analyzed the language and purpose of the
Map Act, it would have been forced to confront the issues raised in
Kelber and Newport Building. The Map Act vests authority to control
subdivision design and improvement in local government. 221 Beyond
that, it lists specific situations in which local government may condition
map approval.222 The supreme court has held that, although power to
condition map approval in additional circumstances may be implied
from the Act,22 the conditions must be consistent with the Act and
must be reasonably related to needs created by the subdivision.224
Every grant of authority to condition map approval on payment of a
fee is restricted to assure that the fee is reasonably required because of
needs created by the subdivision, and that it is used either to benefit the
subdivision or to remedy problems created by the subdivision.225 The
Map Act's repeated emphasis on these requirements led the Kelber
court to conclude that conditioning map approval on payments to ben-
efit the entire city "would directly impede the realization of what ap-
pears to be the intent and meaning of the act."226 The court in Newport
Building took this line of reasoning one step further and concluded that
such conditions conflicted with the Map Act, regardless of whether they
were denominated a fee or a tax.227 The Condominium Tax Law con-
ditioned map approval in a manner unauthorized by the Map Act.
Therefore, it would appear to be in conflict with the Act.
It is possible, on the other hand, that a thorough reading of the
Map Act would not have led to this result. As Justice Marshall ob-
served in his concurring opinion, a local tax will be preempted by a
state statute or scheme only if the two enactments are in "'direct and
219. 39 Cal. 2d 708, 249 P.2d 280 (1952).
220. Id. at 712, 249 P.2d at 283.
221. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66411 (West Supp. 1982).
222. See supra notes 63-76 and accompanying text.
223. Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d at 37, 207 P.2d at 5.
224. Id.
225. See supra note 76.
226. Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d at 638, 318 P.2d at 566.
227. See supra text accompanying note 109.
19831
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
immediate conflict.' "228 Re-examination of the Map Act in light of this
requirement might have prompted the court to conclude that there was
insufficient evidence of conflict to meet the test. A careful analysis of
the Map Act, coupled with an explanation of the reasons why the cases
construing it to date have been erroneous, would have been more ac-
ceptable, even to the critic of such a decision, than the unsatisfying
formalism of the Pines opinion.
B. Impact of Proposition 13 on the Condominium Tax Law
The drafters of Proposition 13,229 apparently anticipating that lo-
cal governments might attempt to offset the shortfall in local property
tax revenues occasioned by the initiative's passage, also included in
Proposition 13 the requirement that any "special taxes" imposed by
cities, counties and "special districts" be approved by a two-thirds vote
of the local electorate. This proposal is embodied in article XIIIA, sec-
tion four of the California Constitution.23 °
The Condominium Tax Law was enacted prior to the passage of
Proposition 13, and plaintiffs in Pines did not argue that the ordinance
was subject to the two-thirds approval requirement of section four.23
Certain local taxes imposed in the wake of the Pines decision may,
however, be subject to that requirement. Thus, it is important to deter-
mine whether taxes like the Condominium Tax Law are "special taxes"
within the meaning of section four.
The California Supreme Court construed Proposition 13 for the
first time in Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State
Board of Equalization. 2 32 In Amador, the court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the amendment on its face, but noted that its language "in a
number of particulars is imprecise and ambiguous" and that it "neces-
228. 29 Cal. 3d at 665, 630 P.2d at 525, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 340 (Marshall, J., concurring)
(quoting Weekes v. City of Oakland, 21 Cal. 3d 386, 392, 579 P.2d 449, 452, 146 Cal. Rptr.
558, 561 (1978)). Justice Marshall acknowledged that because of "the legislature's statutory
promulgation of rules for the governance of condominium construction [referring to the
Map Act], we must conclude that the legislature plainly expects that condominiums will be
built and only constrains such building in the manner prescribed by the statute." Therefore,
he concluded, a conflict between the Condominium Tax Law and the Map Act "may be
inferred." 29 Cal. 3d at 664-65, 630 P.2d at 525, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
229. See supra note 2.
230. CAL. CONsT. art. XIIIA § 4 provides as follows:
Cities, counties and special districts, by a two-thirds vote of the qualified electors of
such district, may impose special taxes on such district, except ad valorem taxes on
real property or a transaction tax or sales tax on the sale of real property within
such City, County or special district.
231. Art. XIIIA contains no language indicating intended retroactivity.
232. 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978).
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sarily and over a period of time will require judicial, legislative, and
administrative construction. ' 233 The court did not define the terms
"special tax" or "special district.""3 4
Efforts by the courts of appeal to define the special tax permitted
by section four were hampered by the tendency of courts, legislators,
and scholars to use the term "special tax" somewhat indiscriminately to
refer both to taxes in general and to special assessments. Special assess-
ments are levies earmarked for particular purposes that specially bene-
fit the property against which they are assessed.2 35 Furthermore, even
before the passage of Proposition 13, the term "special tax" lacked con-
sistent definition." 6 One commentator identified seven separate con-
texts in which a tax had been described as "special." 237 The traditional
distinction between a "general" and a "special" tax has been that the
former is deposited in a general fund, whereas the latter is marked for a
special purpose.
In view of the absence of a settled definition, the supreme court in
Amador left the lower courts with the admonition that they were to
interpret section four with primary reference to the intent of the draft-
ers and the electorate.2 39 The courts of appeal followed this instruction,
agreeing that the intent of the electorate in enacting Proposition 13 was
to provide effective property tax relief.240 They also agreed that section
four was "aimed at limiting local governments' ability to replace funds
233. Id. at 244-45, 583 P.2d at 1299, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 257.
234. In Los Angeles County Transp. Comm'n v. Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d 197, 643 P.2d 941,
182 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1982), the California Supreme Court considered the meaning of the term
"special district," as used in section four. The court concluded that "special districts" that
are not empowered to levy a property tax, such as the Los Angeles County Transportation
Commission, are not affected by section four and may enact special taxes with the approval
of a simple majority of the local voters. Id. at 201, 643 P.2d at 943, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
235. 14 MCQUILLAN, supra note 157, at § 38.01.
236. County of Fresno v. Malmstrom, 94 Cal. App. 3d 974, 983, 156 Cal. Rptr. 777, 782
(1979).
237. Naumann, supra note 3, at 812-17. The seven contexts are: (1) special assessments
lodged against property; (2) any contributions to government (not necessarily property-re-
lated) which are applied to a specific purpose that especially benefits a particular taxpayer,
(3) taxes collected from the population at large to benefit the population at large, but for
specific purposes; (4) taxes imposed on a limited number or particular class of taxpayers, but
for general purposes; (5) a one-time, non-recurring bedroom tax; (6) the State's Bank and
Gross Premiums Insurers' taxes; and (7) special assessments that are illegal because the
amount of the assessment does not correspond to the benefit received by the property.
238. County of Fresno v. Malmstrom, 94 Cal. App. 3d at 983, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 782-83
(citing City of Glendale v. Trondsen, 48 Cal. 2d 93, 99-100, 308 P.2d 1, 4 (1957)).
239. 22 Cal. 3d at 245, 583 P.2d at 1300, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 258. But see supra note 234.
240. See, e.g., Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 322-23, 170
Cal. Rptr. 685, 688 (1981); County of Fresno v. Malmstrom, 94 Cal. App. 3d 974, 980, 156
Cal. Rptr. 777, 780 (1979).
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reduced by other sections of [Proposition 13] by shifting to other types
of taxes."24 Awareness of this purpose caused the court of appeal in
County of Fresno v. Malmstrom to conclude that a county's special as-
sessment for street construction levied against property owners in a
county subdivision was not a "special tax" within the meaning of sec-
tion four.242 Examination of the ballot arguments supporting Proposi-
tion 13 influenced the court's conclusion that the initiative was "aimed
at general taxes and governmental spending." 43
The California Supreme Court ended the speculation about the
meaning of the term "special tax" in City and County of San Francisco
v. Farrell. 2  In Farrell, the court analyzed a city business tax to deter-
mine whether it fell within the ambit of section four. The tax in ques-
tion was a "payroll expense tax" that had been enacted prior to the
passage of Proposition 13. In 1979, one year after the passage of Prop-
osition 13, city supervisors passed an ordinance temporarily raising the
payroll expense tax from 1.1 percent to 1.5 percent to avert a general
city deficit. At the end of the temporary period, 55 percent of the voters
approved an indefinite extension of the rate increase.245 When the city
thereafter sought to appropriate funds to repair elevators in a city hos-
pital, the city and county comptroller refused to certify the availability
of funds, claiming that the increase in the tax rate was illegal because it
was a special tax requiring two-thirds voter approval.246 Although the
tax was clearly not a "special tax" in any of the traditional senses of the
term,247 the comptroller asserted that it was the type of tax the electo-
rate intended to forestall by means of section four. The comptroller
quoted the supreme court's language in Amador:
[S]ince any tax savings resulting from the operation of sec-
tions 1 and 2 could be withdrawn or depleted by additional or
increased state or local levies of other than property taxes,
sections 3 and 4 combine to place restrictions upon the impo-
sition of such taxes. Although sections 3 and 4 do not pertain
solely to the matter of property taxation, both sections, in
241. County of Fresno v. Malmstrom, 94 Cal. App. 3d at 983, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 782; Trent
Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 114 Cal. App. 3d at 324-25, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
242. 94 Cal. App. 3d at 982, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
243. Id. at 981, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 781. Other decisions by the courts of appeal endeavor-
ing to construe section four with reference to the intent of the voters included Mills v.
County of Trinity, 108 Cal. App. 3d 656, 166 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1980), and Trent Meredith, Inc.
v. City of Oxnard, 114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 170 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1981).
244. 32 Cal. 3d 47, 648 P.2d 935, 184 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1982).
245. Id. at 51, 648 P.2d at 937, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
246. Id.
247. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
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combination with sections 1 and 2, are reasonably germane,
and functionally related, to the general subject of property tax
relief.
248
The comptroller urged that this language meant that the phrase "spe-
cial taxes" should be read to mean " 'new,' 'additional,' or 'supplemen-
tal' taxes which are enacted to replace tax revenue lost as a result of
Proposition 13's limitations on the property tax."24 9
The Farrell court admitted that the language could be so inter-
preted, but rejected the construction because it would "read the word
'special' out of the phrase 'special taxes,' in violation of settled rules of
construction." 250 The court summarized its holding as follows: "[W]e
construe the term 'special taxes' in section 4 to mean taxes which are
levied for a specific purpose rather than, as in the present case, a levy
placed in the general fund to be utilized for general governmental
purposes." 1
In dissent, Justice Kaus criticized the anomalous result of the Far-
rell holding:
As construed by the majority, section 4 places no limit what-
soever on the ability of local entities to levy the traditional,
run-of-the-mill revenue-raising taxes for general municipal
purposes, but-quite perversely---only makes it more difficult
for such entities to levy much more unusual and more limited
"special purpose" taxes. Since I can think of no plausible rea-
son for the drafters to have intended such an irrational and
ineffectual scheme, I must respectfully dissent.252
Santa Monica's Condominium Tax Law is such a "traditional, run-of-
the-mill revenue-raising" tax. Despite the purpose of the voters who
248. 32 Cal. 3d at 56, 648 P.2d at 940, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 718 (quoting.Amador, 22 Cal. 3d
at 231, 583 P.2d at 1291, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 249).
249. 32 Cal. 3d at 59, 648 P.2d at 941, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 719 (Kaus, J., dissenting).
250. d. at 56, 648 P.2d at 940, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 718. Justice Kaus, in dissent, observed
that this was not so:
If the word "special" were completely eliminated, section 4 could be read to re-
quire a two-thirds vote of the electorate to authorize any tax levied by local entities
after July 1, 1978, including the mere continuation of local taxes that were already
in place before the adoption of Proposition 13. The inclusion of the modifier "spe-
cial" in section 4 was intended to make it clear that local entities are permitted to
maintain their pre-Proposition 13 nonproperty taxes without a two-thirds voter ap-
proval; only "new" or "additional"--i.e., "special"---taxes, which would inevitably
replace the property tax revenue withheld by other portions of Proposition 13, are
subject to the two-thirds requirement.
Id. at 59, 648 P.2d at 941-42, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 719-20 (Kaus, J., dissenting).
251. Id. at 57, 648 P.2d at 940, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
252. Id. at 58, 648 P.2d at 941, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 719 (Kaus, J., dissenting).
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enacted Article XIIIA, and despite the California Supreme Court's own
admonition, inAmador, that local taxes were to be construed in light of
that electoral purpose, 53 it seems likely that a tax similar to the Condo-
minium Tax Law, if enacted today, would not be subject to the
supermajority requirement of section four.
VI. CONCLUSION
In holding that the Map Act and the City of Santa Monica's Con-
dominium Tax Law do not conflict, the supreme court in Pines avoided
a confrontation with the legislature on the issue of preemption.254 If a
conflict had been found, the necessary next step would have been to
determine whether state or local law was controlling.25 5 To uphold the
Condominium Tax Law in such a debate, the court would have been
required to find that taxation of condominium construction was a mu-
nicipal affair constitutionally immune from preemption by state legisla-
tion. As a result of Pines, the court has delayed the confrontation.
In postponing resolution of the issue, however, the court has dis-
turbed the long-standing balance between state and local control of
subdivision development, giving local government a power to condition
subdivision development that the Map Act itself seems specifically to
withhold. 6 Pines also makes it easier for cities to force new residents
to bear a disproportionate share of the cost of local government. Not
only does Pines permit cities to impose upon new residents costs of
subdivision infrastructure previously borne by the taxpayers at large;
257
it permits cities to require new residents to assume a disproportionate
share of general city expenses. It remains to be seen how cities and
counties will make use of these new-found powers.258 Given the ob-
253. See supra text accompanying note 239.
254. In Weekes v. City of Oakland, 21 Cal. 3d 386, 579 P.2d 449, 146 Cal. Rptr. 558
(1978), the court declined to resolve a related question: whether the home rule provision of
the California Constitution (CAL. CONST. art. XI § 5) prevents the legislature from restrict-
ing the revenue-raising efforts of charter cities. Id. at 391, 579 P.2d at 451, 146 Cal. Rptr. at
560. Justice Richardson noted in a concurring opinion that the court should resolve the
issue to forestall "future litigation over novel municipal levies that are business taxes by
designation but arguably are disguised income taxes statutorily prohibited by [the] Revenue
and Taxation Code. ... .Id. at 398-99, 579 P.2d at 456, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 565 (Richard-
son, J., concurring). Although a resolution of the specific issue raised in Weekes would not
have been dispositive of the questions raised in Pines, it would have gone far to clarify the
muddy waters of "municipal affairs."
255. See supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 63-76 and accompanying text.
257. See supra text accompanying note 9.
258. Plaintiffs in Pines argued that the economic effect of upholding the Condominium
Tax Law would be to depress new condominium construction. To support this contention,
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served tendency of local government to concern itself primarily with
problems of a local nature,259 however, the shift of authority from the
state to the local level may be destined to aggravate California's stead-
fly growing housing problem.
Joanne B. O'Donnell
they presented statistics reflecting a downward trend in the number of condominium units
constructed, beginning with 1973, the year the Condominium Tax Law was enacted: from
862 units in 1973 to 91 units in 1977. Petition for Hearing at 7, The Pines v. City of Santa
Monica, 29 Cal. 3d 656, 630 P.2d 521, 175 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1981).
As Justice Marshall observed in his concurring opinion, the extent to which the marked
decline in condominium construction is attributable to the Condominium Tax Law is un-
clear: "[T]he decline in construction may have been caused by other circumstances, such as
spiraling and rampant inflation or condominium builders' tax rebellion." 29 Cal. 3d at 665,
630 P.2d at 525, 175"Cal. Rptr. at 340 (Marshall, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). Never-
theless, it is certain that the tax will increase the cost of condominiums in Santa Monica and
in any other community that takes advantage of this new opportunity to use the power
granted by the Map Act as a general fund-raising vehicle. If the Tax Law has contributed to
the decline in construction noted by plaintiffs, it seems likely that it has caused a correspond-
ing decline in condominium conversion, which could have a salutary effect on the supply of
rental housing. Although this result would provide small comfort for would-be purchasers,
it would offset to some extent the decline in general housing availability occasioned by the
slump in construction.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
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